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1. Introduction 
In recent years many countries have introduced “Corporate Governance Codes”. These codes 
represent unmistakable improvements in minority shareholder right protection as well as 
transparency, and they generally entail a movement towards Anglo-Saxon institutions. Many 
of the rules in these codes are only recommendations, however, and there is much scepticism 
that best-practice recommendations and/or principles-based approaches are effective substi-
tutes for more rule-based approaches, such as the US Sarbanes Oxley Act. This is all the more 
the case, since there is the widespread perception that markets do not function well in punish-
ing deviant behaviour of managers particularly in Continental Europe, where regulators tend 
to rely heavily on principles-based approaches in their attempts to reform corporate govern-
ance. There are many reasons to believe that markets are less of a constraint on managerial 
discretion in Continental Europe than in the US or UK, in particular. For example, ownership 
and voting right concentration is tremendous, liquidity of shares is low, and there is frequently 
a separation between cash flow and voting rights.4 In general, therefore, the “exit option” is 
less of a threat to firms’ management, and “voice” of institutional investors, in particular, 
ought to be strengthened. 
The existing literature on codes is scant at best, and if it exists it is on the effects of corporate 
governance codes on performance.5 Most recently, Drobetz, Schillhofer, and Zimmermann 
                                        
4 See Barca and Becht (2001), Becht and Röell (1999), Gugler (2001), and La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) for analyses of ownership and voting right concentration. See 
Becht (1999) on liquidity, and see Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) and Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003a) on the separation of voting and cash flow rights. Pagano, Roell, and Zechner (2002) show that 
European markets having the highest trading costs, lowest accounting standards and poorest share-
holder protection fare worst in attracting and retaining cross-border listings. 
5 There is a much more developed literature on the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on 
performance, though. Using firm-level data from 27 developed countries, La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) find that better shareholder protection is associated with higher valuation 
  3 
(2004) construct a corporate governance rating for 91 German firms and find that the rating of 
a firm positively affects market value and the returns to shareholders. Their empirical analysis 
reveals that for the median firm a one standard deviation change in the governance rating re-
sults in about a 24% increase in the value of Tobin’s Q. 
This evidence notwithstanding, there are problems with the link between corporate govern-
ance code ratings and firm performance. First, there is the well-known endogeneity problem 
already mentioned above: if only “good” firms adopt the code (e.g., because the costs are low, 
since they fulfill the code anyway), one must expect a positive code-performance relation-
ship.6 Second, a high rating on the code only indirectly affects performance: a high rating 
must correlate with the true “spirit” of good governance, which can only then affect perform-
ance.7 In fact, very little is known about the underlying mechanism that relates corporate gov-
ernance practices and firm performance (e.g., see Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002)). 
A more cautious approach of analysing corporate governance codes is adopted in this paper. 
We take one step back and do not try to assess the impact of the codes on the performance of 
companies (which is, of course, ultimately the most interesting question). Instead, we use the 
corporate governance rating constructed by Drobetz, Schillhofer, and Zimmermann (2004) for 
publicly listed German firms and analyze the determinants of this rating. This approach has at 
least two advantages. First, we do not run into the same endogeneity problems with the de-
                                                                                                                          
of corporate assets. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) report for a broad sample of US firms that 
firms with stronger shareholder rights receive higher valuations and have higher profits, higher sales 
growth, and lower capital expenditures. Klapper and Love (2003) use firm-level data from 14 emerg-
ing stock markets and also report that better corporate governance is highly correlated with better op-
erating performance and higher market valuation. 
6  On the endogeneity issue and suggestions for cure, see Börsch-Supan and Köke (2002) and Gugler 
and Yurtoglu (2003b). 
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terminants of code fulfilment than we would encounter by trying to assess the effects on firm 
performance. For example, one cannot sensibly argue that a high or low governance rating 
affects the voting rights of the largest shareholder or the size/composition of the supervisory 
board. It must be the case that the decision making process is determined or at least monitored 
by the largest shareholder and/or the board, and their decisions naturally affect compliance 
with the code. The decision to improve corporate governance practices and attitudes should be 
made in awareness of its consequences and obligations (e.g., see Demsetz and Lehn (1985)). 
Second, we only have a cross section of data at hand, and while performance is affected by all 
sorts of past decisions (e.g., on investment, human capital or strategy), the decision to comply 
with the code or not is taken at one moment in time. Thus, we can be confident that our influ-
encing variables such as voting right concentration, accounting practice or size of the board 
are causally related to the firm’s decision to comply with the code. 
Our results show that there is a non- linear relationship between ownership concentration and 
the corporate governance rating. Moreover, firms with larger boards, family-controlled firms, 
and firms lower down a corporate pyramid have lower ratings, but firms that apply US-GAAP 
or IAS rules or use an option-based remuneration plan have higher ratings. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses that 
are subject to empirical testing. Because our corporate governance rating mainly refers to the 
rules and recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code, we give a brief and 
general comparative analysis of the governance codes in place throughout the European Un-
ion in section 3. Section 4 presents our empirical results, and section 5 concludes. 
                                                                                                                          
7  For example, Cuervo (2002) argues that especially in civil law countries such as in Germany the 
codes of good governance can be applied formally, following the letter but not the spirit of the law, 
since they cannot be legally enforced. 
  5 
2. Hypotheses 
We analyse the determinants of the German corporate governance rating, recently developed 
by Drobetz, Schillhofer, and Zimmermann (2004). This rating is largely based on the rules 
and recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code. We postpone a more de-
tailed description of the code until section 3, and formulate our empirical hypotheses in this 
section. 
Germany is  the prototype of an insider system of finance and control, and thus our hypotheses 
as to the determinants of ratings must reflect its institutional background. The most striking 
fact of even large, listed firms in Germany is that ownership and voting right concentration is 
tremendous. While the median largest ultimate voting block in US or UK listed firms is well 
below 10%, this median largest voting block is above 50% in Germany, Italy, or Austria (see 
Becht and Röell, 1999). Therefore, presumably the owner of this block has ultimate control 
over the company and can decide which stance to adopt with regards to the code of good cor-
porate governance. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the voting power of the largest share-
holder affects the code rating. We also develop the notion that the size of the board of direc-
tors, a firm’s accounting principles, and its method of executive remuneration impact the code 
ratings. 
2.1 Ownership concentration 
In the literature two main effects of large shareholders have been disentangled (e.g., see 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002), and Gugler, Mueller, and Yurtoglu (2003a)). First, 
with increasing cash flow rights of the largest shareholder, there is a positive incentive effect. 
A good code rating – provided it is awarded by the capital market – increases the value of the 
firm and, hence, the value of the ownership stake of the largest shareholder. She should there-
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fore have an incentive to comply with the code. However, there is a second, negative en-
trenchment effect. The larger the voting rights of the largest shareholder, the more entrenched 
she is and the more she can influence the decision making process. A high code rating 
achieved by making it easier for small shareholders to cast their votes in general assemblies, 
increasing transparency by disclosing information on individual compensation of manage-
ment and supervisory board, or agreeing to strict incompatibility regulation, to give a few 
example, is not necessarily in the largest shareholder’s interest. We summarize the discussion 
in hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1: Ownership concentration is non- linearly related to the corporate governance 
rating. At low to intermediate holdings of the largest shareholder the entrenchment effect 
outweighs the incentive effect and we expect a negative relation between ownership concen-
tration and the corporate governance rating. At high levels of ownership concentration the 
incentive effects outweighs the entrenchment effect and, hence, we expect a positive relation 
between ownership concentration and the corporate governance rating. 
2.2 Board size 
Our second determinant of code compliance is the size of the supervisory board. The decision 
making process on the supervisory board is likely to be affected by its size for at least two 
reasons. First, coordination problems are larger on a large board compared to a small board. 
Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that large boards can be less effective 
than small boards, presuming that the emphasis on politeness and courtesy in boardrooms is at 
the expense of truth and frankness. Specifically, when boards become too big, agency prob-
lems (e.g., director free-riding) increase and the board becomes more symbolic and neglects 
its monitoring and control duties. Moreover, large boards may reflect an inadequate percep-
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tion of the true executive function, particularly in firms with public involvement. Supporting 
this rather ad-hoc proposition, Yermack (1996) was the first to report empirical evidence for a 
negative relationship between board size and firm valuation (see also Eisenberg, Sundgren, 
and Wells (1998); Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann (2004)). Second, on a large 
board it is likely that more conflicting groups of stakeholders, such as representatives of large 
shareholders, employees, and creditors, are represented than on smaller boards. Third, many 
companies do have a (and if, at most one) representative of small shareholders. However, the 
larger the board the less weight this representative has at a ballot. All of these arguments lead 
us to hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 2: Larger boards tend to be reluctant to adopt “good” corporate governance prac-
tices and, hence, board size is negatively related to the corporate governance rating. 
2.3 Accounting principles 
There are several papers that find significant effects of accounting practices on the perform-
ance of companies as well as on the distribution of profits among stakeholders, e.g., dividends 
or interest payments on debt (see e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1997, 1998, and 2000); Gugler, Mueller, and Yurtoglu (2003b)). In Germany there are three 
possibilities how firms are allowed to account, US-GAAP (US Generally Accepted Account-
ing Principles), IAS (International Accounting Standards) and HGB (“Handelsgesetzbuch”). 
US-GAAP and IAS contain much stricter rules on accounting practices than HGB, which is 
the national law standard for accounting, particularly with respect to transparency and details 
of information. Due to its conservative approach (e.g., historical cost accounting), HGB ac-
counting appears to favor debtholders and large shareholders versus minority shareholders. 
Accounting according to international standards and compliance with the code can be viewed 
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as complements for a number of reasons. First, many of the requirements of code compliance 
are antedated by the decision to account according to international principles. Thus the mar-
ginal costs of code compliance are smaller for these firms than for firms using HGB. Second, 
firms that account with US-GAAP or IAS may want to signal their good investment opportu-
nities, and code compliance is one way to achieve this goal. Finally, although we explicitly 
account for firm size (total assets) in the determinants regressions below, part of the co-
variation in accounting principles and code rating may be attributable to firm size (e.g., due to 
measurement errors of true firm size), which is a main determinant of international account-
ing. Accordingly, we formulate hypothesis 3: 
Hypothesis 3: Firms accounting according to US-GAAP or IAS have higher corporate gov-
ernance ratings than firms accounting according to HGB. 
2.4 Executive remuneration 
Our final variable affecting code rating is whether or not the firm has adopted an option-based 
remuneration plan. Diamond and Verrechia (1982) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) deve l-
oped models that are based on the interaction of capital markets and contingent compensation. 
Giving managers an equity stake in the firm is a solution to ensure that managers pursue the 
interests of shareholders without increasing managerial entrenchment. Provided that a high 
governance rating is awarded by the capital market, management has an incentive to comply 
with the code. Therefore, we formulate hypothesis 4: 
Hypothesis 4: Firms that use an option-based remuneration plan have higher corporate gov-
ernance ratings than other firms. 
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3. Codes of good corporate governance 
3.1. European Corporate Governance Codes 
Recently, all EU member states have adopted at least one governance code document. 8 It is 
generally acknowledged that the legal framework for corporate governance is most effective 
if it aims at ensuring: (i) fair and equitable treatment of all shareholders, (ii) managerial and 
supervisory body accountability, (iii) transparency as to corporate performance, ownership 
structure and governance, and (iv) corporate responsibility. The “soft regulation” of the dif-
ferent European corporate governance codes strongly reflects this regulatory philosophy. 
While the codes originate from countries with very diverse cultures, financing traditions, 
ownership structures, and legal origins, they are remarkably similar in their general notion of 
“best practice” corporate governance rules. In fact, codes appear to serve as a converging 
force in corporate governance practices. Nevertheless, two observations are noteworthy. First, 
the coverage of the codes can differ substantially due to differences in the legal origins and 
frameworks. Some codes address principles and practices of corporate governance that other 
nations establish more fully through company laws and securities regulation. Second, due to 
differences in ownership structure, some codes strongly emphasize the ability of the supervi-
sory body to hold managers accountable to a broad base of relatively dispersed shareholders 
(e.g., in the UK). Other codes put the focus on the protection of minority shareholders to en-
sure equal treatment when there is a dominant shareholder and ensuring that a controlling 
                                        
8  Specifically, a variety of organizations have issued governance codes, including governmental 
entities, committees and commissions organized or appointed by governments, stock exchange-related 
bodies as well as business, industry and academic associations. In addition to national codes, several 
pan-European and international governance codes have emerged (e.g., the OECD Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance). For the codes of almost 40 countries, see http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.htm. 
For an extensive comparative analysis we refer to: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/news/corp-gov-codes-rpt_en.htm. 
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shareholder, and/or cross-holding arrangements do not overly influence supervisory and man-
agement bodies (e.g., in Germany). 
As regards to the stated objectives, the codes can be characterized as having three major 
themes: (i) stakeholder and/or shareholder interests, (ii) the work of supervisory and manage-
rial bodies, and (iii) disclosure requirements. First, different codes articulate the purpose of 
corporate governance in different ways, i.e., some emphasize broad stakeholder interests and 
others emphasize ownership rights of shareholders. However, the majority of codes recognize 
that corporate success, shareholder profit, employee security and well being, and the interests 
of other stakeholders are strongly interrelated. To the extent that codes directly address share-
holder rights, they generally call for shareholders to be treated equitable, disproportional vo t-
ing rights to be avoided or at least fully disclosed to all shareholders, and removal of barriers 
to shareholder participation in general meetings, whether in person or in proxy. 9 Second, all 
codes strongly relate to the notion that supervisory responsibilities are distinct from manage-
ment responsibilities. Despite structural differences between two-tier and unitary board sys-
tems, the codes express consensus on issues relating to board structure, roles and responsibili-
ties. Many suggest practices designed to enhance the distinction between the roles of the su-
pervisory and managerial bodies, including supervisory body independence, separation of the 
chairman and CEO roles, and reliance on board committees. Another important issue in virtu-
ally all codes is the proposition that some supervisory body functions may be delegated, at 
least to some degree, to board committees (e.g., a nominating committee).10 Finally, all codes 
contain various disclosure requirements. An issue that received specific public attention is the 
                                        
9  Baums and Fraune (1994) report that typically only 58 percent, on average, of all voting rights are 
represented at the annual meeting of a German publicly listed firm. 
10  For empirical analysis see Loderer and Peyer (2002). 
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greater voluntary transparency as to executive and director compensation. 11 In addition, the 
codes also support the increasing public interest on disclosure as regards to director independ-
ence (in both one-tier board and two-tier board systems), share ownership, and in many in-
stances, issues of broader social concerns. 
With regards to code enforcement, the prescriptions supplement and complement the manda-
tory prescriptions provided by company and securities laws and listing rules. However, they 
are non- imperative and lack mandatory compliance authority. The vast majority of codes 
merely require companies to provide greater voluntary disclosure of governance practices, 
including in some instances, disclosure about the extent of compliance with a particular code. 
Alternatively, several codes rely on a mandatory disclosure requirement to encourage compli-
ance. Listed companies are required to disclose whether they comply with the specified code 
and explain any deviations (“comply or explain”). Even though compliance with code provi-
sions is wholly voluntary, reputational market forces can result in significant compliance 
pressures. Finally, codes are increasingly used by investors and market analysts, rating agen-
cies, shareholder monitoring groups and commentators to benchmark supervisory and man-
agement bodies. 
3.2. The German Corporate Governance Code 
After a few private interest groups began establishing best practices of corporate governance 
in the late 1990s, in June 2000 the German federal government appointed a commission with 
the goal to formulate proposals for modernizing German corporate law. The results of this 
report laid the ground, among other things, for the development of a national code for improv-
                                        
11  Because two thirds of the German firms included in the DAX blue-chip index opted out and do not 
report the salaries of each director separately, the public discussion has intensified only recently. There 
are even suggestions by major political parties to cap management pay. 
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ing the management and control functions of publicly quoted companies. The results were 
elaborated to the code of conduct by a second, follow-up commission. The German Corporate 
Governance Code was finally published on 26 February 2002, and the Transparency and Dis-
closure Act (TransPuG), which took effect on 26 July, 2002, obliges the boards of directors 
and supervisory boards of publicly quoted companies on the application of the code recom-
mendations. The code is an example of self-commitment by the corporate sector and requires 
disclosure on the “comply or explain” rule described in section 3.1. This enables companies to 
reflect sector- and firm-specific requirements and contributes to more flexibility and self-
regulation in the German corporate constitution. It also reflects the common belief that im-
plementing adequate governance structures should be understood as a chance, as opposed to 
an obligation, by corporate decision makers. 
Interestingly, the stated goal of the code is to “promote the trust of international and national 
investors, customers, employees and the general public in the management and supervision of 
listed German stock corporations”. 12 This is in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon view of corporate 
governance, where there is little room for the general public. Nevertheless, the code consti-
tutes a regime shift in the German corporate governance system. It takes a surprisingly prag-
matic view on the “fundamental” differences in stakeholder and shareholder interests, an issue 
that has been fiercely debated in particular in the German literature (e.g., see Albach (2003)). 
The code clearly recognizes that corporate success, shareholder profit, employee security and 
the interests of other stakeholders are heavily co-dependent. 
 
                                        
12  See the German Corporate Governance Code (2002), www.corporate-governance-code.de. 
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4. Data description 
4.1. A German corporate governance rating 
The corporate governance rating applied in this paper is from Drobetz, Schillhofer, and 
Zimmermann (2003, 2004). They construct a broad, multifactor corporate governance rating, 
which is based on responses to a survey sent out to a broad sample of German publicly listed 
firms. To qualify for an inclusion into the corporate governance rating, each practice and atti-
tude (i) had to refer to a governance element that is not (yet) legally required and (ii) needed 
to be considered as international market practice from an investor’s perspective. The (not le-
gally required) recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code provided a natu-
ral starting point for a survey analysis. In fact, most proxies included in the rating represent 
recommendations and suggestions of the German Corporate Governance Code. Note that 
while the former work according to the comply-or-explain principle, the latter are wholly vo l-
untary. A few other governance proxies originate from the DVFA German Corporate Govern-
ance Scorecard13, from CalPERS German Market Principles, and from the Deminor Corporate 
Governance Checklist. In total, the rating contains 30 governance proxies divided into five 
categories: (1) corporate governance commitment, (2) shareholder rights, (3) transparency, (4) 
management and supervisory board matters, and (5) auditing. A sample of representative 
questions in each category is listed below: 
§ Are there firm-specific corporate governance guidelines set out in writing? 
§ Are there measures in place to facilitate the personal exercising of shareholder voting 
rights (e.g., via internet) and to assist the shareholders in the use of proxies? 
                                        
13  DVFA is the German Society of Investment Analysis and Asset Management. 
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§ Are the fixed and variable remuneration elements as well as share ownership (including 
existing option rights) of members of the management and supervisory board published 
separately and in individualized form in the notes to the financial statements? 
§ Are there supervisory board committees to deal with complex matters (e.g., audit, com-
pensation, strategy)? 
§ Are there firm-specific rules to ensure that the auditor does not perform other services for 
the firm (e.g., consulting work)? 
The questionnaire with all thirty governance proxies was sent out to all firms in the four prin-
cipal market segments of the German stock exchange: DAX 30 (blue-chip stocks), MDAX 
(mid-cap stocks), NEMAX 50 (index of growth firms), and SDAX (small-cap stocks), com-
prising a total of 253 firms. Data collection was completed at the end of March 2002. Overall, 
the survey had a response ratio of 36 percent, which results in a sample of 91 German firms. 
The construction principles of the aggregate governance rating are kept simple. First, a higher 
acceptance level of a proxy variable indicates an active move by the firm’s management to 
have improved its governance system. Second, 25 basis points are added for each acceptance 
level of the respective proxy in a five-scale answering range. Finally, for each firm the aggre-
gate rating is an unweighted sum of the basis points across all proxies, ranging from 0 (mini-
mum) to 30 (maximum).14 This straightforward procedure results in an aggregate corporate 
governance rating and five sub- indices for each category mentioned above. Hence, the inde-
pendent variables in our empirical analysis are: OVERALL (aggregate corporate governance 
rating), CG_UNT (governance commitment), CG_AKT (shareholder rights), CG_TRA (trans-
parency), CG_ENT (management and supervisory board matters), and CG_ABS (auditing). 
                                        
14  More in-depth analysis in Drobetz, Schillhofer, and Zimmermann (2004) shows that an equal-
weighting scheme is not a restrictive assumption. 
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Figure 1 shows the distribution of the corporate governance rating. To simplify, the ratings 
have been rounded to the nearest integer. The histogram shows that the rating over the 91 
firms in our sample is slightly skewed to the right. More than 40% of the firms have a rating 
between 20 and 23. Nevertheless, the figure reveals that the governance proxies are ade-
quately selected to reach a sufficiently wide distribution, which mitigates a possible sample 
selection bias in the survey. 
Panel A in Table I presents summary statistics of the dependent variables. Due to data limita-
tions for the independent variables, the sample in our empirical analysis is reduced to 80 
firms. The average rating is 19.51, with firm ratings ranging from 9.75 to 27.25. The sub-
indices with the highest ratings are CG_ENT (management and supervisory matters) and 
CG_TRA (transparency), which can be explained by the fact that these areas are strongly ac-
companied by laws and regulation. 
[Insert Figure I here] 
4.2. Explanatory variables 
The data for ownership structure/voting rights are based on the  CD-ROM “Wer gehört zu 
Wem” (Who owns whom?, 30 April 2002) and from “BaFin (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdien-
stleistungsaufsicht, March 2002)”. All other variables are based on annual reports as of end 
2001. To appropriately capture the distribution of control rights and decision power among 
shareholders, we use voting concentration as a proxy for ownership concentration. Following 
the hypothesis formulated in section 2, we construct several variables related to voting con-
centration. VR1 denotes the voting rights of the largest ultimate shareholder. To account for a 
possibly non- linear relationship between ownership concentration and the corporate govern-
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ance rating, VR1^2 is the squared value of VR1. Alternatively, we follow Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1988) and use the following variables to estimate piecewise linear regressions: 
VR1_25  = voting rights of the largest shareholder if voting rights < 25%, 
  = 25% if voting right of the largest shareholder ³ 25%; 
VR1_25to50 = 0 if the voting rights of the largest shareholder < 25%, 
  = voting rights of the largest shareholder minus 25% 
  if 25% £ voting rights < 50%, 
  = 25% if voting rights of the largest shareholder ³ 50%; 
VR1_50  = 0 if voting rights of the largest shareholder < 50%, 
  = voting rights minus 50% of voting rights ³ 50%. 
Panel B in Table I presents a breakdown of the aggregate corporate governance rating by four 
breaking points of ownership concentration. The average rating is higher than 21 points if the 
largest shareholder holds less than 25% in voting rights, but it is lower than 19 (18) points if 
VR1 is larger than 25% (50%) but smaller than 50% (75%). The average rating again in-
creases above 19 points if the firm is in super-majority control (VR1>75%). This hints at pos-
sible non- linear effects of the largest shareholder on firms’ ratings. 
To estimate the relationship between board size and the corporate governance rating, 
BOARDSIZE denotes the number of directors on the company’s supervisory board. The data 
is taken from the firms’ annual reports as of year-end 2001. GAAP is a dummy variable and 
equals 1 if a firm uses US-GAAP as the accounting standards in its annual report, and equals 
0 otherwise. Similarly, IAS is a dummy variable and is set to 1 if IAS are used as accounting 
standards in the annual reports, and equals 0 otherwise. OPTION is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the firm uses an option-based remuneration plan, and 0 otherwise. Finally, we use 
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two additional control variables: (i) SIZE is defined as the natural logarithm of the book value 
of total assets, and (ii) TQ refers to the Tobin’s Q, approximated as the ratio of market value 
of equity plus liabilities divided by book value of total assets. A summary statistics of the in-
dependent variables is given in panel C of Table I. 
[Insert Table I here] 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Main empirical results 
Table II presents our main results. In each regression the dependent variable is the German 
corporate governance rating, originally developed by Drobetz, Schillhofer, and Zimmermann 
(2004). In equation (1), VR1 and SIZE are the only independent variables. The corresponding 
coefficient on VR1 is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. Controlling for 
size, we observe that larger voting rights are associated with lower governance ratings, indi-
cating than the entrenchment effect, on average, dominates the alignment effect. We will ex-
plore this relation in more detail below. As expected, the coefficient on SIZE is positive and 
statistically significant. The explanatory power (adjusted R2) for this simplest regression 
specification is almost 20%. 
In equation (2), BOARDSIZE is included as an additional explanatory variable. Confirming 
our second hypothesis, the relationship between board size and the governance rating is sig-
nificantly negative. The analysis again controls for firm size, taking into account that larger 
firms also possess larger boards. This result confirms the hypothesis by Jensen (1993) and 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992), suggesting that larger boards are hampered by coordination and 
communication problems. In addition, the decision finding process may be complicated by 
more conflicting groups of stakeholders in larger boards. 
  18 
Equation (3) contains the full set of explanatory variables, where the possibly nonlinear rela-
tionship between the corporate governance rating and the voting rights by the largest share-
holders is captured using the three variables related to the breakpoints described in section 
4.2. We find supporting evidence for all four hypotheses. First, there is some evidence that the 
relationship between the corporate governance rating and ownership concentration is non-
linear. At intermediate holdings of the largest shareholder the entrenchment effect dominates 
the incentive effect, as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient on the VR25_50 
variable. However, with ownership concentration above 50%, the incentive alignment effect 
dominates, as reflected by the positive (albeit insignificant) coefficient on the VR1_50 vari-
able. Together, these results imply a U-shaped relationship between the corporate governance 
rating and ownership concentration. In addition, confirming our second hypothesis, board size 
is negatively related to the corporate governance rating even when we include all our explana-
tory variables. The coefficient on BOARDSIZE is estimated significantly at the 5 percent 
level. Our empirical results further support the third hypothesis, hence, firms accounting ac-
cording to US-GAAP or IAS have higher governance ratings than firms accounting according 
to HGB. This is ind icated by the significant positive coefficients on both the GAAP and IAS 
dummy variables. Finally, we find supporting evidence for our fourth hypothesis that firms 
with option-based remuneration plans have higher governance ratings than other firms. The 
coefficient on OPTION is (marginally) significantly positive. Again, the regression controls 
for firm size, as measured by TA, confirming that larger firms exhibit a higher governance 
rating. Finally, the explanatory power is reasonably high, with an adjusted R-square of 45.5 
percent. 
In equation (4) we use VR1 and VR1^2, in addition to all other explanatory variables, to 
measure the non- linear relationship between the governance rating and ownership concentra-
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tion. The results confirm our previous findings. The coefficients on VR1 and VR1^2 are sig-
nificantly negative (at 5% level) and positive (at 10% level), respectively, again indicating a 
U-shaped relationship between the governance rating and ownership concentration. All other 
coefficient estimates are as before. 
[Insert Table II here] 
5.2. Robustness tests 
In order to determine the reliability of our results, we conduct two robustness tests for equa-
tion (4) in Table II. First, we test whether industry-effects drive the results and estimate a 
fixed-effects model. Using the Dow Jones STOXX classification scheme, the model incorpo-
rates intercepts for 18 industries. The estimation results are shown in Table III. Compared to 
the previous results in Table II, VR1 and IAS are now significant only at the 10% level, and 
the squared term VR^2 as well as BOARDSIZE and OPTION turn insignificant. The notion 
that industry is a determinant of board size, compensation packages and accounting standards 
should come as no surprise. For example, supervisory boards of traditional industries tend to 
be larger, while boards of “New Economy” firms are smaller. Furthermore, the optimal com-
pensation package is likely to be influenced by the presence of asymmetric information be-
tween principal and agent, by the riskiness of the firm’s environment and by its “asset speci-
ficity” (e.g., see Demsetz and Lehn (1985)). All of these firm characteristics are likely to be 
influenced by the industry a firm operates in. 
[Insert Table III here] 
As a second robustness test, note that one (so far) possibly omitted variable is the perform-
ance of a firm. Firms with better performance and higher valuations could be more inclined to 
choose better corporate governance instruments as they can afford to invest in better control 
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systems or to rebel against suppressive majority investors. We apply Tobin’s Q as a measure 
of firm valuation and use this variable as an additional explanatory variable for the govern-
ance rating. To account for endogeneity, we estimate a two-stage least square regression. The 
first stage regression involves a regression of Tobin’s Q on all exogenous variables and the 
following instrument variables: industry dummies (18 different industry dummies according 
to the Dow Jones STOXX classification), a firm’s beta value calculated from monthly stock 
returns over the period from 1998 to 2001, and the natural logarithm of the age of the firm. 
The second stage regression applies all governance mechanisms and the fitted value of 
Tobin’s Q as the explanatory variables. As shown in Table III, Tobin’s Q is insignificant, a 
Hausman-test accepts exogeneity, and all the results for the different corporate governance 
mechanisms remain qualitatively the same, both in magnitude of the coefficients and their 
level of significance. Overall, these results indicate that our previous results for the baseline 
regressions in Table II are not afflicted by the inclusion/exclusion of Tobin’s Q. 
5.3. Results for the components of the governance rating 
In this section we split the aggregate rating into its five components: (1) shareholder rights, 
(2) management and supervisory board matters, (3) transparency, (4) governance commit-
ment, and (5) auditing. The results of the regressions using the respective sub- indices as de-
pendent variables are shown in Table IV. 
Shareholder rights (eq. 1 in Table IV) encompass criteria such as the one-share-one-vote prin-
ciple, subscription rights for capital increases, and modern communication (i.e., internet) used 
for the general meeting and/or the voting process. As can be seen from equation (1) in Table 
IV, there is no positive part in the relation between this sub- index and VR1. Regressing VR1  
linearly on the shareholder rights rating, VR1 is estimated significantly (at the 5% level) nega-
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tive. This indicates that the largest shareholder is particularly wary of code recommendations 
that increase the control rights of minority shareholders. 
A significantly negative/positive relationship between VR1 and a sub- index are obtained for 
the categories management and supervisory board matters (eq. 2) and auditing (eq. 5). Man-
agement and supervisory board matters encompass dimensions like remuneration and per-
formance criteria of board members; disclosure of individual board members’ variable and 
fixed pay components in the annual reports; selection process of directors; separate commit-
tees within the board; and the number of board members’ directorships. We therefore argue 
that this category (besides shareholder rights) is the most relevant with respect to corporate 
governance improvement. Given that board size also has a significantly negative influence, 
our main results are confirmed strongest for this sub- index. 
[Insert Table IV here] 
None of our corporate governance variables are significant in the regression for the category 
transparency (eq. 3). Together with the fact that the average rating is extremely high (4.55 out 
of a maximum of 5), this reflects the general understanding in Germany as well as in other 
Continental European countries that transparency is vital for good corporate governance, and 
not even large shareholders can oppose. A major improvement in transparency legislation was 
achieved when the European Union’s Transparency Directive (88/627/EEC) was transposed 
into German law and became effective at the beginning of 1995. 
The component related to governance commitment (eq. 4) investigates whether there are cor-
porate governance guidelines set out in writing, or whether there is a corporate governance 
representative reporting on corporate governance issues to the supervisory board. The only 
significant governance variable is GAAP. This could be explained by the fact that firms, em-
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ploying US-GAAP are those which strive for a listing in the US, where corporate governance 
is organised more formally, and where it is more common to structure the corporation accord-
ing to corporate governance guidelines. 
Finally, the sub- index referring to auditing (eq. 5) is based on the following questions: Do 
quarterly reports contain segment reporting? Are there firm-specific rules to ensure that the 
auditor does not perform other services for the firm? Does the annual report contain informa-
tion about the risk-management system of the corporation? Besides the significant nega-
tive/positive VR1 influence, international accounting standards (IAS and GAAP) exert a posi-
tive and significant influence on auditing. International accounting standards, which are sup-
posed to reveal more information than national accounting standards, also raise the quality of 
auditing. 
6. Conclusion 
There is mounting empirical evidence that there is a relationship between the quality of firm-
level corporate governance and firm valuation. Ultimately, this is the only reason why corpo-
rate governance issues should be of interest for financial economists at all. Unfortunately, all 
empirical studies are inherently plagued with endogeneity problems, as causality could well 
run from performance to governance. This paper circumvents the problem of causality by 
taking one step back and investiga ting the determinants of good corporate governance as 
measured by the corporate governance rating of Drobetz, Schillhofer, and Zimmermann 
(2004). It is ultimately the owners who decide (or at least monitor the decision) on whether or 
not to adopt better governance practices. Therefore, ownership structure can safely be re-
garded as exogenous in our context. This is all the more the case in Cont inental European 
countries, where significant ownership concentration is the rule rather than an exception. 
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Similarly, the structure of the supervisory authorities can be expected to affect the governance 
rating of a firm. The board of directors ultimately takes the decisions with respect to all gov-
ernance issues (and, hence, has to assume responsibility for all corporate governance malfunc-
tions), and it is hard to believe that causality runs from high or low corporate governance rat-
ings to board size or board composition. 
While our research question is clearly a lot more modest than directly exploring the link be-
tween corporate governance and firm valuation, we still uncover several interesting interrela-
tionships within firms. We confirm the non- linear relationship between ownership concentra-
tion and the quality of firm-level governance familiar from previous governance/performance 
studies. We interpret it as being caused by two opposing influences, incentive alignment and 
entrenchment, and document a significant entrenchment effect at intermediate hold ings of the 
largest shareholder (between 25 and 50%). With increasing holdings of the largest sharehold-
ers (more than 50%), there are positive wealth effects and, hence, incentive effects starting to 
dominate. Our results hold up strongest when analysing the sub- index relating to management 
and supervisory board matters. In addition, firms with larger board size have lower govern-
ance ratings, but firms that apply US-GAAP or IAS rules and/or use an option-based remu-
neration plan have higher governance ratings. 
It is worth putting our results into perspective. First, there is a positive and reassuring mes-
sage. Corporate governance codes potentially improve the governance and decision making 
processes of companies. Otherwise, if provisions were not binding anyway, large shareholders 
or large boards had no need to oppose (some of) them (e.g., transparency of executive pay). 
Second, however, there is a more negative and cautious conclusion that follows from our re-
sults. Large shareholders still have a tight grip on companies and veto recommendations that 
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might lead to a loss of their control and power, such as recommendations for one-share-one-
vote or disclosure of individual board members’ pay. This questions the comply-or-explain 
approach and calls for a more rules based approach in reforming corporate governance in 
Europe. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of the German corporate governance rating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure shows the distribution of the survey-based corporate governance rating (CGR) for 91 
German public firms  from Drobetz, Schillhofer, and Zimmermann (2004). The survey was sent out in 
February 2002, and the data collection was completed by the end of March 2002. The rating repre-
sents an unweighted sum of the basis points (on a five-scale answering range) for all governance prox-
ies in five broad categories: (1) corporate governance commitment, (2) shareholder rights, (3) trans-
parency, (4) management and supervisory board matters, and (5) auditing. The corporate governance 
rating ranges from 0 (minimum) to 30 (maximum). The ratings in the figure are rounded to the nearest 
integer. 
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Table I: Summary statistics 
Variables Mean Median Minimum Maximum Obs. 
Panel A: Aggregate rating and components 
OVERALL 19.51 19.75 9.75 27.25 85 
CG_UNT 2.27 2.00 0.00 5.00 85 
CG_AKT 3.07 3.00 0.00 5.00 85 
CG_TRA 4.55 4.75 2.00 5.00 85 
CG_ENT 5.98 6.25 1.25 9.50 85 
CG_ABS 3.63 3.75 1.00 5.00 85 
Panel B: Aggregate rating by ownership concentration 
VR1<25% 21.42    33 
25%£VR1>50% 18.67    21 
50%£VR1>75% 17.30    21 
VR1³75% 19.47    8 
Panel C: Independent variables 
VR1 37.13 31.85 4.60 100.00 80 
VR1^2 2,112.94 1,014.45 21.16 10,000.00 80 
VR1_25 19.80 25.00 4.60 25.00 85 
VR1_25to50 12.01 9.10 0.00 25.00 85 
VR1_50 6.45 0.00 0.00 50.00 80 
BOARDSIZE 10.29 8.00 3.00 21.00 85 
GAAP 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 85 
IAS 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00 85 
OPTION 0.60 1.00 0.00 1.00 85 
TA 13.78 13.22 8.26 20.64 85 
TQ 1.63 1.17 0.46 8.02 85 
 
The variables relating to the corporate governance score are drawn from the study by Drobetz, Schillhofer, 
and Zimmermann (2004), estimates on the ownership structure are based on the CD-ROM “Wer gehört zu 
Wem” (Who owns whom?, 30 April 2002) and from “BaFin (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsauf-
sicht)” March 2002, all the rest of the calculations are based on annual reports as of end 2001. The independ-
ent variables are: OVERALL (corporate governance rating), CG_UNT (governance commitment), CG_AKT 
(shareholder rights), CG_TRA (transparency), CG_ENT (management and supervisory board matters), 
CG_ABS (auditing). The corporate governance variables are: VR1 denotes the voting rights of the largest ul-
timate shareholder, and VR1^2 is the squared value of VR1. VR1_25 equals the voting rights of the largest 
shareholder if the voting rights are below 25%, in any other case it is set to 25%. VR1_25to50 is 0 if the vot-
ing rights of the largest investor are below 25%, if the voting rights are beyond or equal to 25% and below 
50%, this variable is calculated as voting rights –25%. VR1_50 is set to 0 if the voting rights are below 50%, 
in any other case it is computed as voting rights –50%. BOARDSIZE is the number of directors on the com-
pany’s supervisory board. GAAP is a dummy variable and equals 1 if US-GAAP are used as accounting stan-
dards in the annual reports and equals 0 otherwise. IAS is a dummy variable and is set to 1 if IAS are used as 
accounting standards in the annual reports and equals 0 otherwise. OPTION is a dummy variable and equals 1 
if the firm uses an option-based remuneration plan and 0 otherwise. TA is defined as the natural logarithm of 
the book value of total assets. TQ equals the ratio of market value of equity plus liabilities divided by book 
value of total assets. 
 
Table II: Main equations 
Eq. VR1 VR1^2 VR1_25 VR1_25to50 VR1_50 BOARDSIZE GAAP IAS OPTION TA Const. Obs. Adj. R² 
(1) -0.0300         0.5457 13.0737 80 0.1965 
 (-2.18)**         (3.72)*** (5.92)***   
(2) -0.0296     -0.3429    1.2584 6.7290 80 0.2793 
 (-2.26)**     (-3.14)***    (4.73)*** (2.31)**   
(3)   0.0061 -0.0969 0.0468 -0.2536 3.2071 1.6669 1.2759 0.9555 7.4942 80 0.4555 
   (0.10) (-2.09)** (1.55) (-2.54)** (3.59)*** (2.31)** (1.81)* (3.87)*** (2.76)***   
(4) -0.0834 0.0007    -0.2447 3.0942 1.6288 1.2002 0.9627 8.2896 80 0.4470 
 (-2.08)** (1.75)*    (-2.44)** (3.48)*** (2.24)** (1.69)* (3.88)*** (3.06)***   
 
The estimating sample contains 85 German firms; variations are due to data limitations. Time period: 2002. The table shows the results from OLS regressions of the 
corporate governance rating as dependent variable on the main corporate governance mechanisms along with the control variable. Eq. (1) is a partial model with owner-
ship concentration explaining the corporate governance score. Eq. (2) introduces another corporate governance mechanism, the firm’s board, into the equation. Eq. (3) 
includes all corporate governance mechanisms and is similar to the piece-wise linear regression estimated by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), however, other turn-
ing points are used. Eq. (4) allows for non-linearities by including a squared term. The dependent variable refers to the corporate governance rating as calculated by 
Drobetz, Schillhofer, and Zimmermann (2004). The corporate governance variables are: VR1 denotes the voting rights of the largest ultimate shareholder, and VR1^2 is 
the squared value of VR1. VR1_25  equals the voting rights of the largest shareholder if the voting rights are below 25%, in any other case it is set to 25%. VR1_25to50 
is 0 if the voting rights of the largest investor are below 25%, if the voting rights are beyond or equal to 25% and below 50%, this variable is calculated as voting rights 
–25%. VR1_50 is set to 0 if the voting rights are below 50%, in any other case it is computed as voting rights –50%. BOARDSIZE refers to the number of directors on 
the company’s supervisory board. GAAP is a dummy variable and equals 1 if US-GAAP are used as accounting standards in the annual reports and equals 0 otherwise. 
IAS is a dummy variable and is set to 1 if IAS are used as accounting standards in the annual reports and equals 0 otherwise. OPTION is a dummy variable and equals 1 
if the firm uses an option-based remuneration plan and 0 otherwise. The control variable is TA, the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. ***/**/* denotes 
significance at the 0.01/0.05/0.10 error level, respectively. 
 
Table III. Robustness tests 
 Industry fixed effects Endogeneity (2SLS) 
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
VR1 -0.0880 (-1.79)* -0.0737 (-1.71)* 
VR1^2 0.0007 (1.37) 0.0007 (1.52) 
BOARDSIZE -0.1000 (-0.72) -0.2776 (-2.58)** 
GAAP 3.5001 (2.99)*** 2.5774 (2.40)** 
IAS 1.5394 (1.84)* 1.6891 (2.24)** 
OPTION 1.1015 (1.13) 1.1029 (1.40) 
TA 0.6701 (1.91)* 1.0926 (3.85)*** 
TQ   0.3518 (0.75) 
Const. 11.0366 (2.86)*** 6.2065 (1.71)* 
Obs. 80  77  
Adj. R² 0.3685  0.4458  
Hausman-test:     
c2(7)    2.55 
p-value    0.9232 
 
The estimating sample contains 85 German firms; variations are due to data limitations. Time period: 2002. The table shows 
robustness test for equation (4) from Table II. The first specification applies an industry -fixed effect model to equation (4). The 
second specification uses two-stage least squares whereby in the first stage TQ (Tobin’s Q, ratio of market value of equity plus 
liabilities divided by total book value of assets) is regressed on the following instruments: industry (refers to 18 different 
industries from Dow Jones EURO-STOXX classification), beta value calculated from monthly stock returns over the period 
from 1998 to 2001, and the natural logarithm of the age of the firm. A Hausman-test accepts exogeneity. The dependent 
variable refers to the corporate governance score as calculated by Drobetz, Schillhofer, and Zimmermann (2004). The corporate 
governance variables are: VR1 denotes the voting rights of the largest ultimate shareholder, and VR1^2 is the squared value of 
VR1. BOARDSIZE is the number of directors on the company’s supervisory board. GAAP is a dummy variable and equals 1 if 
US-GAAP are used as accounting standards in the annual reports and equals 0 otherwise. IAS is a dummy variable and is set to 
1 if IAS are used as accounting standards in the annual reports and equals 0 otherwise. OPTION is a dummy variable and 
equals 1 if the firm uses an option-based remuneration plan and 0 otherwise. The control variable is TA, the natural logarithm 
of the book value of total assets. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 0.01/0.05/0.10 error level, respectively. 
Table IV: Components of the corporate governance rating 
Eq. VR1 VR1^2 BOARDSIZE GAAP IAS OPTION TA Const. Obs. Adj. R² 
(1) -0.0046 -0.00003 -0.0256 0.1152 0.3189 0.4539 0.2218 0.0721 80 0.3131 
 (-0.38) (-0.23) (-0.83) (0.42) (1.44) (2.09)** (2.93)*** (0.09)   
(2) -0.0590 0.0006 -0.1375 1.2683 0.5007 0.4978 0.4001 2.0826 80 0.3134 
 (-2.68)*** (2.52)** (-2.49)** (2.60)*** (1.25) (1.27) (2.93)*** (1.40)   
(3) 0.0019 -0.000001 -0.0148 -0.0530 -0.0892 0.1962 0.0864 3.3753 80 0.0431 
 (0.26) (-0.01) (-0.79) (-0.32) (-0.65) (1.47) (1.85)* (6.61)***   
(4) 0.0080 -0.0001 -0.0494 0.9239 0.1061 -0.1883 0.1917 -0.0021 80 0.0656 
 (0.41) (-0.69) (-1.01) (2.14)** (0.30) (-0.55) (1.59) (-0.00)   
(5) -0.0297 0.0003 -0.0174 0.8397 0.7922 0.2406 0.0628 2.7616 80 0.2769 
 (-2.53)** (2.61)*** (-0.59) (3.22)*** (3.72)*** (1.15) (0.86) (3.47)***   
 
The estimating sample contains 85 German firms; variations are due to data limitations. Time period: 2002. The table shows the results from OLS regressions of the compo-
nents of the corporate governance rating as dependent variables on the main corporate governance mechanisms along with the control variable. The dependent variables in 
the different equations are: Eq. (1) shareholder rights (“Aktionärsrechte”). Eq. (2) management and supervisory board matters (“Entscheidungs- u. Kontrollgremien”). Eq. 
(3) transparency (“Transparenz”). Eq. (4) governance commitment (“Unternehmensausrichtung und Corporate Governance”). Eq. (5) auditing (“Abschlussprüfung”). The 
corporate governance variables are: VR1 denotes the voting rights of the largest ultimate shareholder, and VR1^2 is the squared value of VR1. BOARDSIZE is the number of 
directors on the company’s supervisory board. GAAP is a dummy variable and equals 1 if US-GAAP are used as accounting standards in the annual reports and equals 0 oth-
erwise. IAS is a dummy variable and is set to 1 if IAS are used as accounting standards in the annual reports and equals 0 otherwise. OPTION is a dummy variable and 
equals 1 if the firm uses an option-based remuneration plan and 0 otherwise. The control variable is TA, the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. ***/**/* de-
notes significance at the 0.01/0.05/0.10 error level, respectively. 
